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Abstract 
We analyse incentives for collusive behaviour when heterogeneous providers are faced with regulated 
prices under two forms of yardstick competition, namely discriminatory and uniform schemes. Providers 
are heterogeneous in the degree to which their interests correspond to those of the regulator, with close 
correspondence labelled altruism. Deviation of interests may arise as a result of de-nationalisation or 
when private providers enter predominantly public markets. 
We assess how provider strategies and incentives to collude relate to provider characteristics and across 
different market structures. We differentiate between “pure” markets with either only self-interested 
providers or with only altruistic providers and “pluralistic” markets with a mix of provider type. 
We find that the incentive for collusion under a discriminatory scheme increases in the degree to which 
markets are self-interested whereas under a uniform scheme the likelihood increases in the degree of 
provider homogeneity. Providers’ choice of cost also depends on the yardstick scheme and market 
structure. In general, costs are higher under the uniform scheme, reflecting its weaker incentives. In a 
pluralistic market under the discriminatory scheme each provider’s choice of cost is decreasing in the 
degree of the other provider’s altruism, so a self-interested provider will operate at a lower cost than an 
altruistic provider. Under the uniform scheme providers always choose to operate at the same cost. The 
prospect of defection serves to moderate the chosen level of operating cost. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Many countries have introduced some form of yardstick competition in order to regulate prices in 
contexts where providers face limited competitive pressure. Examples are the maximum price limits each 
water company may charge its customers in the UK (Ofwat, 1993); price caps imposed by the Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission to hold down the wholesale price of natural gas and electricity in 
interstate commerce in the US (US Department of Energy, 2002); postal tariffs determined by 
independent regulators in countries such as Germany, the Netherlands and the UK (NERA, 2004); and 
prospective payment system (PPS) that have been introduced to pay for health care services in many 
countries (Schreyögg et al., 2006; Ma, 1994). 
The fundamental idea behind yardstick competition is that the price (or price cap) faced by each provider 
is dependent on the actions of all the other providers (Shleifer, 1985; Laffont and Tirole, 1993). 
According to Shleifer’s discriminatory rule, the price each provider faces is based on the costs of all other 
providers in the industry but not its own. This creates strong incentives for cost control: each provider’s 
cost reducing effort will not be detrimental to the price it faces. Incentives are weaker when a uniform 
pricing rule is applied, under which all providers face common prices or price caps.  
A potential drawback with yardstick competition is that providers have an incentive to collude on higher 
costs, first because they can get a higher price for their services and, second, because they can exert less 
cost reducing effort, thereby benefiting from slack (Wilson, 1989) .  
In contexts where there is a large number of providers, this is unlikely to be problematic, mainly because 
the cost of collusion rises (Pope, 1989). But there is greater potential for collusive behaviour in contexts 
where there is a limited number of providers. This is likely for utilities, rail or postal services. But it can 
arise in health care, for instance because specialist services (like bone marrow or lung transplantation) 
are concentrated among a handful of providers or in places such as Northern Ireland or Iceland, which are 
considering introducing PPS arrangements despite there being fewer than five hospitals in each country. 
The incentive to collude with other providers will depend on the objectives of the provider, particularly 
the extent to which their objectives correspond with those of the price-setting regulator. We use the terms 
“altruistic” to describe providers that have objectives closely related to those of the regulator and 
“self-interested” to describe providers whose interests are more divergent from those of the regulator 
(Rose-Ackerman, 1996; Bozeman, 1984; Rainey et al. 1976). If providers differ in their degree of 
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altruism, they may behave quite differently in response to financial incentives (Aas, 1995). Divergence 
among providers may arise in situations where greater plurality of provision is being encouraged. For 
example, traditionally public (National Health Service) systems such as England, France, Portugal and 
Italy are encouraging more private sector organisations to enter the health care market (Oliveira and 
Pinto, 2002; Aballea et al 2006; Levaggi, 2007;  Pollock and Godden 2008). Similarly many countries 
have de-nationalised many services, either wholly or in part. Public providers may have a strong sense of 
mission, aiming to maximize the well-being of the people they serve (Wilson 1989), just as the regulator 
would like. But private providers are also accountable to their shareholders, with an interest in profit 
making. This implies that they have a weaker sense of “public” service mission, and might have 
objectives that are less closely aligned to those of the regulator (Newhouse, 1970; Hansmann, 1980; 
Glaeser and Shleifer, 2001). 
There are a number of works that have addressed the issue of collusion under yardstick competition 
(Boardman et al 1986; Tangeras, 2002; Chong and Huet, 2005). Our paper is particularly close to Potters 
et. al. (2004). The authors present an adapted version of Schleifer's model (Schleifer, 1985) and test it 
experimentally in order to explore collusion incentives under different yardstick competition schemes. 
However the existing literature assumes homogeneous providers. The aim of the paper is to analyze by 
means of a theoretical model how incentives to collude relate to provider characteristics (altruistic or 
self-interested) and across different market structures4. We differentiate between “pure” markets with 
either only self-interested providers or with only altruistic providers and “pluralistic” markets with a mix 
of provider type. For each yardstick scheme, we analyse the choice of cost when providers do not 
co-operate and when they collude, and we consider incentives to defect from the collusive agreement. 
When a discriminatory yardstick rule is considered, we find that an industry populated by self-interested 
providers is more prone to collusion than a mixed market which in turn is more prone to collusion than an 
industry served by altruistic providers. When we consider a uniform yardstick rule we find that pure 
markets are more prone to collusion than mixed markets.  
Providers’ choice of cost also depends on the yardstick scheme and market structure. In general, costs are 
higher under the uniform scheme, reflecting its weaker incentives. In a pluralistic market under the 
discriminatory scheme each provider’s choice of cost is decreasing in the degree of the other provider’s 
altruism, so a self-interested provider will operate at a lower cost than an altruistic provider. Under the 
uniform scheme providers always choose to operate at the same cost. The possibility of defection serves 
                                                 
4 In the context of this paper we define market structure very narrowly as asymmetry in provider altruism. 
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to moderate the chosen level of operating cost. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the main assumptions of the model, and considers 
collusive behaviour under a discriminatory yardstick competition model. Section 3 presents the results 
under the uniform yardstick regulatory rule. Section 4 summarizes the main results of the paper and 
section 5 draws the main conclusions. 
 
 
2. The Model 
 
Consider a market with three types of agent: consumers, providers and a regulatory authority. We 
consider two providers  i   with  i  1,2   each with its own population of consumers defined 
geographically, so that each provider is a local monopolist facing a downward-sloping demand curve  
qpi  with  pi   being the price paid by consumers for each unit of service q .  
In some contexts, such as for postal services or utilities, consumers may face the full or a partially 
subsidised price. In the health care context, where services are often free at the point of consumption, we 
can assume that providers compete on the basis of quality (Pope, 1989). Quality is loosely defined, but 
might include low waiting times and good amenities, all of which are cost increasing, the implication 
being that demand is decreasing in the cost of quality. 
Under yardstick competition, the regulator establishes a payment that gives the providers incentives to 
reduce costs. We will start the model by considering a discriminatory yardstick, whereby each provider 
faces a regulated price set beforehand equal to the average (say) of the marginal costs of all the other 
providers in the market except from its own. We assume that costs are observed by the regulator. 
The regulator sets a cap -  p̂   - on the price that each provider can charge. Note that this restriction will 
bind in equilibrium (i.e.  ∂p̂/∂pi  0  ). If not, there would be no need for regulation. 
The main objectives of a regulation policy are to promote technical efficiency and allocative efficiency 
by simulating the outcomes of competitive markets (Laffont and Tirole, 1993). When providers enjoy a 
degree of monopoly power, they can provide a lower volume of output than they would in a competitive 
situation and, thereby, secure higher prices. This causes welfare loss. Moreover, monopoly firms lack 
incentives to be cost efficient, thus undermining technical efficiency. 
The utility of provider i  - Ui - is a function of the regulated price ipˆ , the marginal costs ic  and the 
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altruism level i . We assume that altruistic and self-interested providers are distinguished by their 
degree to which they are concerned about consumer surplus,  
 
)()( xdxqCS
p

         (1)
 
This is graphically represented by the area under the demand curve for their services, above their 
price.  Recall that consumer surplus is decreasing in the unit price of the service, so that the greater the 
degree of altruism, the greater the utility the providers derive from lower prices. 
We further assume that the provider cares about consumer welfare to some proportion   i   with  
i  1,2  .Without loss of generality we assume that provider 2 is more altruistic than provider 1, i.e.  
1 2  .  
Provider’s benefit from slack, )( icS . This element captures the utility from avoiding cost reducing effort 
(Bradford and Craycraft, 1996; Pope, 1989). The benefit of slack )( icS  is an increasing function of cost 
at a decreasing rate (S ′ci  0 ,S ′′ci  0).  
Thus the utility of each provider is given by the sum of net revenues, the benefit from slack, and the 
utility the provider derives from increased consumer welfare, 
)()()()ˆ()ˆ( ),,ˆ(
ˆ
xdxqcSpqcpcpU
ip
iiiiiiiii                                  (2) 
 
  
 2.1The first best 
 
For comparison purposes we first develop a benchmark. Consider a first best scenario by which the 
regulator can decide on both the price and the cost of each service. In each local market the optimum is 
then characterized by the pair  pi,ci   that maximizes social welfare (.)W  given by the sum of 
consumer surplus and the provider's utility, i.e.: 
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)()()()()()1(),( iiii
p
iii cSpqcpxdxqcpW                                                       (3) 
with  i  1,2.   
Maximizing welfare with respect to price and cost, the social optimum5 is then given by the first order 
conditions with respect to the price, 
 
)()()( iiiii pqpqcp                           (4)
  
and with respect to the cost, 
 
)()( ii pqcS                                    (5) 
 
According to (4) the optimal price should be such that the marginal net revenues due to an increase in the 
price equal the change in consumer surplus weighed by the altruistic parameter   i . Correspondingly (5) 
entails that the provider's marginal benefit from slack should be equal to the effect of increased costs on 
revenues. From (4), the socially optimum price rule can be written as: 
  cp qp∗/q′p∗  
Given that qp∗/q ′p∗ is a negative term, then for  1,0   the first best price is lower than the 
marginal cost. 
For   i  0  , i.e. in the case of purely self-interested providers, the first best is such that price equals the 
marginal cost: 
 
p∗  c∗  
 
 2.2 The provider's problem 
We will analyse two types of game. First we start by describing a setting in which providers strategically 
chose the cost level in a one shot game. In section 2.3 we characterize a repeated game. 
                                                 
5Social optimum solved in Appendix 
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In each one shot game, each provider  i  wishes to maximize utility, achieved by choosing the cost  ci   
given the price rule to which the regulator will commit. Provider  i  's problem is given by, 
 
)()()()ˆ()ˆ( ),ˆ( max
ˆ
xdxqcSpqcpcpU
i
i p
iiiiiiiiic 

                                 (6) 
 
The first order condition with respect to cost 0/  ii cU , is given by 
 
 ∂p̂i∂ci − 1qp̂i  p̂i − ci
∂qp̂i
∂p̂i
∂p̂i
∂ci  S
′ci −  iqp̂i ∂p̂i∂ci  0  
 
Since we are considering a two-agent model, the yardstick rule is such that provider i  faces a price per 
service that is equal to the other provider's marginal cost in providing the same service, i.e. .ˆ ii cp   
 
 
Non cooperative solution 
 
When the two providers act non-cooperatively the first order condition is given by, 
 
    2,1 ,1,0   0)()( 

 icScqUc iiiii
    (7) 
 
Note that, firstly, despite differing in the degree of altruism, providers' non cooperative choices are 
symmetric, i.e.  ncncnc ccc  21   (where the superscript  nc   indicates the non cooperative solution). 
Take the more altruistic provider ( 2i ), which affords greater weight to consumer surplus. The price 
this provider faces depends on the costs of the other provider, implying that the consumer surplus has less 
influence on its own choice of costs. The opposite rationale holds for the more self-interested provider. 
The implication is that the first order condition (7) is analogous to that found in the social optimum (5). 
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Comparing (7) with (5), we can see the two providers optimally choose a cost that is equal to the social 
optimum, i.e.   ccc ncnc 21  . This result arises for the simple reason that, while a provider’s cost 
reduction leads to a reduced price faced by the other provider, it does not adversely affect its own price. 
This arrangement gives both providers strong incentives to operate at a socially optimal cost level. These 
results apply to any market structure irrespective of the degree of altruism
 
0
/
/
0
/
/
22
2
22
2





 ii
iii
i
i
nc
ii
iii
i
i
nc
cV
cV
d
dc
cV
cV
d
dc




     (8) 
          
 
The achievement of the socially optimal cost is not related to any altruistic feature of the objective 
function. It is simply the result of the utility maximizing behaviour of each provider. 
 
Cooperative solution 
 
Still on a one shot game, the next step is to allow the providers to collude on costs. The advantage of 
collusion is that the providers can avoid “competing” against each other in lowering their production 
costs. Collusion allows providers to limit their cost reducing effort while receiving a higher price for their 
services. Offsetting these benefits, there are the negative effects resulting from lower demand as well as 
reduced consumer surplus (which affects utility in proportion of ). Thus, the final outcome will depend 
on the balance of these effects. 
If there is collusion, providers maximize their joint utilities -JU- by optimally choosing the cost of 
production: 
 
)()()()()( max
,
xdxqcScqccJU
i
ii c
iiiii
icc
 


   
The choice of cost for each provider is given by, 
 
2,1  0)()1()()()()( 



icqcqcccScq
c
JU
iiiiiii
i
  (9) 
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Note that the decisions are symmetric apart from the differences between providers' altruistic levels, 
namely )( 12 cq  and )( 21 cq . This implies that the costs in one provider decrease in relation to the 
level of altruism displayed by the other. Thus for 1 2    
 
cc cc 21   
where the superscript  c   indicates the cooperative solution. 
As before, the more altruistic provider cannot influence the consumer surplus it produces as this depends 
solely on the cost chosen by the other, less altruistic, provider. The situation under this discriminatory 
yardstick regime is akin to the two providers swapping their roles. Indeed, even though provider 2 is 
more altruistic than provider 1, a situation of pure collusion is such that provider 1 is most cost 
responsive in order to reflect the impact of costs on consumer surplus. Comparing the collusive with the 
non-cooperative behaviour rule, for a given cc2 , we note that the cooperative strategy and the 
non-cooperative best response of provider 1 , as given respectively by (9) and (7), differ in the term, 
 
0)()()()1( 12112   cccc cqcccq  
 
The first term is the net effect that provider 1's cost directly has on provider 2's revenues.  The second 
term is the effect of a unit of provider 1's cost on the joint surplus as determined through the demand 
function. As we may note, eventually the impact is positive because 21 cc cc  . Thus we can conclude 
that, for a given  c2  , the cooperative strategy of the more self-interested provider is that it will operate at 
a higher cost than if there was no collusion. 
The same comparison for the more altruistic provider 2 leads us to an ambiguous conclusion. In fact we 
find that, for a given  c1  , although the optimal decision is still the product of the same two effects as 
before, these now have opposite signs. Nevertheless, we are able to say something more by considering a 
particular case.  Let us consider the case by which the market is served by a purely self-interested 
provider ( 01  ) and an altruistic provider (2 ≠ 0) and compare this situation to one in which there 
are two purely self-interested providers ( 0i ). Analysing (9) evaluated in a mixed market we obtain: 
Provider 1:   0)()1()()()()( 1212112   cqcqcccScq    (10) 
Provider 2:   0)()()()()( 221221   cqcqcccScq    (11) 
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and comparing with the optimal decisions arising in a market comprising only purely self-interested 
providers: 
Provider 1:   0)()()()()( 112112   cqcqcccScq  
Provider 2:   0)()()()()( 221221   cqcqcccScq  
 
Providers’ cooperative solutions in the different market structures differ in the altruistic component, 
−2qc1 in (10). It follows that, for a given c2 , the altruistic component makes provider 1 choose a 
lower cost in mixed markets. 
Given the same line of argument, comparing (10) and (11) with the cooperative strategies in a market 
comprising altruistic providers ( 0i ): 
Provider 1:   0)()1()()()()( 1212112   cqcqcccScq   
Provider 2:   0)()1()()()()( 2121221   cqcqcccScq   
We note that the difference between these conditions is the altruistic term )( 21 cq  missing in equation 
(11). Therefore, it follows that, for a given 1c , provider 2 in a mixed market operates at a higher cost than 
it would if the market was served solely by altruistic providers. 
Thus, with the exception of providers that are completely altruistic, when there is collusion providers will 
always choose to operate at a higher cost than in the social optimum. This holds irrespective of the 
market structure. 
Finally, we provide comparative statics, 
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This demonstrates that the optimal cost of provider  i  when collusion takes place is independent of its 
own altruism level and is decreasing in the degree of the other's altruism. 
Given that the consumer surplus depends on the regulated price and given that the regulatory scheme sets 
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ii cp ˆ , the maximization of the joint utilities –JU- is such that provider  i ’s choice will affect provider 
- i  ’s consumer surplus. It follows that provider i  makes a decision on costs bearing in mind the altruism 
level of the other provider.  
 
Defection solution 
 
We will now analyse the incentives to deviate from the collusive agreement. Consider provider  i  . If this 
provider defects from the collusive agreement, then it will revert to behaving accordingly to the best 
response function as in (7) but evaluated at  c−inc  c−ic  , with the optimal defection cost dic  (where the 
superscript  d   indicates the defection solution) satisfying 
 
0)()(   dici cScq  
It can be shown that  ci
d
i
nc
i ccc   . Intuitively, provider  i  chooses a cost dic < cic , given the choice of 
the other, and it would still face a higher price and therefore increase its surplus. The provider’s decision 
is based on the maximization of its own utility and the first order condition will coincide with the non 
cooperative first order condition. However the defection level will differ from the non cooperative level 
as provider –i is still playing the cooperative solution. Therefore, i’s defection cost has to be higher than 
the optimal non cooperative choice. 
Note that the defection cost is independent of the degree of altruism, 
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Recall that by defecting from the collusive agreement the provider can revert simply maximizing its own 
utility6 just as would happen in a non cooperative scenario. But we have already found that the optimal 
strategy in non cooperation is to choose the socially optimum cost independently of any altruistic 
concern.  
                                                 
6 Disregarding the impact of its decision on the other provider’s utility 
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To sum up we have shown that in a one shot game defection is always profitable and, consequently, 
collusion is never sustainable. Therefore the one shot Nash equilibrium is non cooperative. 
This result is consistent to the findings of the existent literature (Tirole, 1988). 
 
 2.3 Repeated game: Incentives to collude 
 
Let us consider a repeated game in which the providers can play grim trigger strategies (Friedman, 1971). 
At the beginning of each period the two providers agree on a cost  c̄i . But if one of them defects in some 
period  t  , choosing a cost level  ci ≠ c̄i  , then in  t  1   the other provider reverts to play his best 
response to defection from that point onwards. This is a typical "trigger strategy", whereby if a provider 
deviates from the collusive agreement all providers revert to the one shot Nash equilibrium from thereon. 
Therefore, in deciding whether to stick to the collusive agreement, a provider compares the stream of 
profits of cooperating  )1/( cU   with the stream of utilities obtained by deviating  )1/(   ncd UU , 
where δ=1/(1+r). Here  1,0  denotes the discount rate (with   ,0r ),  ncU   is the equilibrium 
payoff the provider receives in the non-cooperative scenario,  cU   is the payoff gained in collusion and  
dU   is the payoff obtained in defection. Therefore, we can define the threshold discount rate  r   as the 
maximum discount rate that can support the collusive equilibrium by  
cd
ncc
UU
UUr 
  
   
The higher the rate the greater is the incentive to collude. 
The threshold discount rate that can support collusion in a mixed market is given by, 
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with   i ∈ 0,1 .           
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We note the denominator in (14) does not depend on the level of altruism. The numerator shows the 
difference between the collusive payoff and the non cooperative payoff. If providers switch to the 
co-operative strategy, the altruistic provider gains less than the self-interested provider. This is because 
collusion reduces the amount of consumer surplus. This reduction is captured by the final bracketed term 
in the numerator, the size the reduction conditional upon the value of i . In fact, it is easy to see that 7, in 
the case of purely altruistic providers, i.e. for    1, joint utility maximization yields the first best 
solution. It is as if there no incentives to collude. Indeed note that  0*  ici rcc 8.   
 
For the special case in which providers have the same degree of altruism the rate turns out to be, 
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We will now proceed with some comparative static analysis to study how provider  i  's behaviour 
changes with degree of altruism of provider  −i  . Our aim is to assess the change in behaviour of any 
provider when passing either from a mixed market to a pure market or vice versa. 
Let us consider, first, the case of provider 1, the more self-interested provider, by differentiating (14) 
with respect to  2 ,   
 
 
 (16) 
   
Note that the denominator is always positive. Therefore, the sign of (14) will depend solely on the sign of 
the numerator. Given (8), (12) and (13), it can be shown that 0/ 21  cU ,  0/ 21  ncU  and 
0/ 21  dU . Moreover, the difference  ncc UU 11    is positive; otherwise there would be no incentive 
to collude9. We have also shown that  cd UU 11    is positive with providers attaining higher payoffs from 
                                                 
7See Appendix for illustration of results 
8 In fact the non- cooperative payoff is equal to the collusive one 
 
9 Recall that we have shown that the cooperative payoff is higher than the non cooperative payoff 
      211 1121211121212
1 ////
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
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defecting than by cooperating in a one shot game. 
It then follows that ∂r1D/∂2  0 , i.e., as provider 2’s degree of altruism diminishes, provider 1’s rate 
increases. In other words, the rate of the more self-interested provider, when it shares a market with a 
more altruistic provider, is lower than the analogous rate in a market served by two purely self-interested 
providers. Thus results show that the incentive to collude is higher in a market covered only by 
self-interested providers than in a mixed market.  
Analogously for provider 2, given (8), (12) and (13), it can be shown that 0/ 12  cU , 0/ 12  ncU ,  
0/ 12  dU  ,    022  cd UU   and    022  ncc UU  . Therefore it follows that 0
1
2 


r , i.e., as 
provider 1's degree of altruism increases, provider 2's rate diminishes.  
Thus, the results show that the rate (incentive to collude) to a more altruistic provider when interacting 
with a more self-interested provider is higher than the rate in a market served by two altruistic providers. 
As such, plurality renders markets to become “average” regarding incentives for providers to collude.  
In summary, the incentive for collusion is stronger in a market served by self-interested providers than in 
a mixed market. In turn, the incentive is stronger in mixed market than in one served by altruistic 
providers. Note that, while the first result is in line with the existing literature that has shown that 
asymmetries between providers are an obstacle to collusion (see for e.g. Scherer, 1970; Barla, 2000; 
Compte and Ray, 2002), the second result suggests that the incentive for collusion is dependent on the 
nature of provider heterogeneity. 
 
3. Uniform Yardstick Competition 
 
So far we have considered a yardstick competition regulatory environment by which each provider is 
paid according to the cost performance of its competitors. An alternative scheme is one in which the price 
or price cap is uniform across providers. This arrangement typifies the prospective payment systems that 
have been implemented to pay for health services in many countries (Street et al., 2007; Schreyogg et al., 
2006). In such settings the price is based on the observed costs of all providers in the market, which might 
be summarised at the average, i.e. 



n
i
ii cn
p
1
1ˆ  
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 As the number of providers increases, the weight of each provider's cost on the industry average 
progressively decreases, and therefore this (uniform) system approaches the previous (discriminatory) 
one. 
Reverting again to our two-provider model, we find that the non cooperative one shot equilibrium cost 
Unc
ic
,  (with i=1, 2 and the superscript U indicating the uniform scheme) given by the following decision 
rule 
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is higher than the first best, *, cc Unci  . This is true for any market structure considered. The reason is that 
the effort exerted by the provider in reducing costs negatively affects its own yardstick, thus the provider 
itself has an incentive to maintain costs above the socially optimal level. Moreover, in a mixed market 
structure, the more altruistic provider chooses a lower cost than the more self-interested provider does. 
Recall that the discriminatory regime affords providers strong incentives to attain the social optimum and 
this result is independent of the level of altruism. The uniform yardstick, instead, involves greater 
efficiency losses confirming it as a lower powered incentive scheme. That said, the uniform rule allows 
the altruism of the provider to counteract the lack of efficiency properties. That is, if the provider is 
altruistic the efficiency losses are partially offset by the provider’s concern about consumer surplus. 
 
If there is collusion the providers’ one shot optimal decision rules are symmetric in either market 
structure 
0)
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  iiiiii
i
i
ccqccqcS
c
JU 
   (18) 
 
and the optimal decisions are above the socially optimum,  *, cc Uci  . 
Note that the situation is akin to that under discriminatory rule, where providers’ costs are higher than the 
social optimum. This is because under either yardstick rule it pays to agree on a higher cost in order to 
secure a higher price from the regulator. By comparing (9) with (18), we notice that the marginal effects 
of cost on the joint surplus, brought in (9) by the demand and the price, drop off the decision rule (18) 
because of the symmetry that characterizes the uniform scheme. As under the discriminatory rule, the 
 17
provider’s decision under the uniform regime accounts for the benefit from slack as well as for the effect 
of its strategy regarding the consumer surplus realised by the other provider. However, unlike the 
discriminatory scheme, the provider internalizes the effect that its cost strategy has on its own consumer 
surplus.  
Comparing costs in pure markets we observe that, UncUc cc ,,   i.e. costs are higher when collusion occurs. 
But results in mixed markets are ambiguous as can be seen by comparing (17) with (18). In (17) the first 
two terms represent the effects of the increased cost on the provider's revenues, respectively through the 
positive effect on the price and through the negative effect on demand. We note that, when it comes to the 
maximization of joint utilities -JU- the previous effects on both providers’ revenues offset each other. 
Thus providers’ optimal decisions account for the benefit from slack and the effect that the other’s cost 
strategy has on its own consumer surplus. In contrast, the collusive solution shown in (18) is such that 
each provider accounts for the effect of its strategy on the consumer surplus achieved by the other 
provider. Given that these effects move in different directions, the equilibrium cooperative cost will 
depend on their magnitude. 
Note that in the special case where one of the providers is purely altruistic (i.e. 2 1  ), the cost when 
providers collude is lower than when they do not co-operate. 
It follows that, even though we can rank the costs in a pure market - UcUdUnc ccc ,,,  - results are 
inconclusive about the effect of defection on costs in a mixed market. Under either yardstick rule there is 
some scope to defect from the agreed solution. In fact, if providers operate according to their non 
cooperative optimal decision rule, choosing a cost lower than when they collude, they can still make 
profit and benefit from slack. 
 
Therefore when analysing the incentives to collude we can conclude that in a pure market, the uniform 
rule is less prone to collusive behaviour (see Appendix for rate comparison). This is because providers 
have an incentive to operate at a higher cost than the social optimum, so the pay-off from collusion is 
lower under this scheme than under the discriminatory one.  
We now consider how provider  i  's behaviour changes with degree of altruism of provider  −i  under the 
uniform yardstick scheme: i
U
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Given that the denominator in (19) is always positive, we need to determine the sign of numerator. 
Take the first element ( i
nc
ii
c
i UU    // ). It is possible to show that, 
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where 0

i
c
ic
 and the term in brackets is the difference between the cost effects on the consumer 
surplus of the two providers. Furthermore, we found that, 
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where 0



i
nc
ic
 . The term in brackets comprises two effects: the net effect of costs on consumer surplus 
and the effect of costs on revenues 
Take the self-interested provider, so that 1i . It follows that 0/ 21  cU  and 0/ 21  ncU . That 
is an increase in the level of altruism of the other provider reduces both the collusive and the 
non-cooperative payoff under a uniform scheme.  Recall that under the discriminatory scheme there was 
no reduction in the non-cooperative payoff because the optimal solution was independent of the degree 
of altruism, reflecting its status as a more powerful incentive scheme. 
Returning to the uniform scheme, the sign of (19) is indeterminate and will depend on the magnitude of 
the effects (20) and (21) that change the relative profitability from collusion. That said the term in 
brackets in (21) is larger than the one in (20) because the effect of the self-interested provider’s costs on 
its revenues is positive. It follows that 21 /  ncU > 21 /  cU .  
Following the same line of reasoning, consider now the third element in the numerator of (19), 
( i
c
ii
d
i UU    // ).  It is easy to show that, 
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Even though the sign of (22) is ambiguous, it is possible to show that 21 /  cU > 21 /  dU , because 
the effect of defection on revenues is negative. Given the inequalities above, we obtain a rate change that 
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is negatively correlated to the change in altruism, 0/ 21  Ur . This is the same result as in the 
discriminatory scheme. Hence we conclude that as provider 2’s degree of altruism diminishes provider 
1’s rate increases.  Therefore we can conclude that the incentive to collude for a self-interested provider 
is higher in a market served only by self-interested providers than in a mixed market. 
Following the same line of arguments for the altruistic provider 2i , we find that  0/ 12  cU . 
Intuitively, when an altruistic provider shifts from a mixed market to one with more altruistic providers 
its equilibrium collusive payoff will increase. 
Even though the sign of both 12 /  ncU  and 12 /  dU is ambiguous, by comparing the magnitude of 
the effects it is possible to show that 12 /  cU > 12 /  ncU  and 12 /  dU < 12 /  cU . These 
inequalities entail a positive change in rate, 0/ 12  Ur , i.e. in a mixed market as provider 1’s degree 
of altruism increases, the incentive for the altruistic provider to collude increases.  
Note that the last result contrasts to that obtained under the discriminatory scheme where the incentive 
for collusion is stronger in a market served by self-interested providers and weaker in one served by 
altruistic providers. Under the uniform rule, increasing plurality of the market reduces the incentive for 
collusion. 
 
 
4. Summary of results 
 
In the previous sections we have shown that under a discriminatory yardstick regulatory rule the 
incentive to collude increases in the degree to which markets are self-interested. In fact, a market served 
by self-interested providers is more prone to collusion than a mixed market and, in turn, providers in a 
mixed market are more likely to collude than providers in an altruistic market. As such increasing the 
plurality of provision will not necessarily always lead to a market more susceptible to collusion. It will all 
depend on the composition of the original market. 
Under the uniform rule, instead, results show that increasing the plurality of providers decreases 
incentives to collude irrespective of whether the mixed market replaces a previously self interested or 
altruistic market. 
We compare costs to the first best and results are summarised in table 1. 
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Table 1. Summary of results 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Under a discriminatory scheme when there is no collusion providers will choose to operate at a cost equal 
to the first best. This is due to the strong incentives embedded in the discriminatory form of yardstick 
competition whereby the provider’s cost reducing effort does not adversely affect the price it faces. 
When there is collusion providers will operate at a higher cost than the first best. Each provider’s choice 
of cost is decreasing in the degree of the other provider’s altruism, so a self-interested provider will 
operate at a lower cost than an altruistic provider in a pluralistic market. Given that one provider sticks to 
the collusion agreement, the other provider faces the incentive to defect, that is to choose a lower 
operating cost. 
 
Under a uniform yardstick scheme with no collusion providers choose to operate at a higher cost than the 
first best, with costs increasing in the degree of the provider’s self-interest. The choice to operate at a cost 
Yardstick scheme Non-cooperation Collusion Defection 
Discriminatory *
21 ccc
ncnc  for all 
market structures 
*
12 ccc
cc  for 
pluralistic markets 
*
12 ccc
cc   for pure 
markets 
c
i
d
i
nc
i ccc   for 
all i and for all 
market structures  
Uniform *
21 ccc
ncnc  for 
pluralistic market 
*
21 ccc
ncnc   for 
pure markets 
*
21 ccc
cc  for 
pluralistic market. 
Results are ambiguous 
as to comparisons 
with the 
non-cooperative case.  
*
21 cccc
nccc  for 
pure markets 
Comparison 
unfeasible for a 
pluralistic market. 
c
i
d
i
nc
i ccc   for 
all i in pure 
markets 
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above the first best reflects the weaker incentives associated with this regime, where a provider’s cost 
reducing effort has adverse consequences for the price it faces. Providers in a pluralistic market choose to 
operate at the same cost, which again is above the first best but it is unclear whether this cost higher or 
lower than chosen when providers do not collude. Providers operating in pure markets will collude on a 
higher cost under a uniform scheme than they would have under the discriminatory scheme and in the 
absence of collusion. As to the incentive for defection, results for the mixed market are unclear about the 
cost ranking. Intuitively, and as demonstrated by the results for the pure markets, under a uniform 
scheme providers face the same incentive to defect from the collusive agreement as they do under the 
discriminatory scheme. The gains from defection, though, are smaller under the uniform scheme. 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
A potential drawback with yardstick competition regulation is that it might be susceptible to collusion, 
because by colluding on higher costs, providers may be able to secure a higher price for their services. 
We suggest that the incentive will depend both on the particular form of yardstick regulation and on the 
degree to which provider objectives correspond to those of the regulator. 
There are a number of works that have addressed the issue of collusion under yardstick competition 
(Tangeras, 2002; Chong and Huet 2006; Potters et al. 2004). The unifying element of the existing 
literature is that it assumes homogeneous providers. The paper that lies the closest to ours is Potters et al. 
(2004). The authors adapt Shleifer’s model (Schleifer, 1985) to explore their hypothesis that the 
incentive to collude tacitly depends on the particular form of yardstick competition that is applied.  
We generalize their analysis by allowing for i) provider heterogeneity in their degree of altruism and ii) 
by considering different market structures. Thus, the contribution of our research is that we relax the 
assumption of homogeneity among providers to analyse how collusion incentives relate to plurality of 
provision across different providers (altruistic vs. self-interested) and across different health care 
structures (pure markets vs. mixed markets). 
We believe that by relaxing the assumption of provider homogeneity we can capture a fundamental 
change in the provision of public services where greater plurality is being encouraged. For example, 
traditionally public health systems such as England, France, Portugal and Italy are encouraging more 
private sector organisations to enter the health care market. Similarly many countries have 
de-nationalised many other public services, either wholly or in part. The important qualitatively different 
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results obtained by our framework indicate that market structure should be considered when designing 
yardstick competition arrangements. 
We find that the incentive for collusion depends on both the nature of the yardstick scheme and on the 
composition of the market. Under a uniform scheme, the incentive for collusion is decreasing in the 
degree of provider heterogeneity. This means that pure markets served either by only self-interested 
providers or by only altruistic providers are both more susceptible to collusion than a pluralistic market.  
There is some intuition to this result. Indeed it is easier to coordinate on a particular cost for providers 
that share similar objectives and, therefore, it is more likely that these providers will stick to an  
agreement. This result is consistent with the recognition that the more providers differ in their cost 
functions, the less likely they will engage in maximization of joint profits (Scherer, 1970) and with the 
vast literature that has shown that asymmetries between providers are an obstacle to collusion (see for e.g. 
Barla, 2000; Compte and Ray, 2002). More generally, our work relates to a wider stream of theoretical 
literature about industrial organization. In recent years, this literature has explored the role of different 
sources of provider asymmetries on collusive behaviour: Rothschild (1999) focussed on cost asymmetry, 
Compte and Ray (2002) on capacity heterogeneity, Kühn (2004) on product variety, Vasconcelos (2005) 
on capacity/costs, and Davies and Olczak (2008) on market shares. Although the specifics of these 
models vary, the whole literature seems to cast a general message that asymmetries reduce the likelihood 
of collusion.  
Our study considers how asymmetry affects providers’ incentives to collude, with asymmetry defined as 
the degree to which provider objectives correspond to those of the regulator. Under a discriminatory 
scheme results are somewhat striking. Indeed, in contrast to the uniform scenario, the incentive to collude 
is no longer dictated by provider symmetry. In fact we have been able to show that an industry populated 
by self-interested providers is more prone to collusion than a mixed market which in turn is more prone to 
collusion than an industry served by altruistic providers. 
This “unexpected” result can also be explained intuitively. Even if there are two homogeneous altruistic 
providers in the market, they will not gain from collusive behaviour. Nevertheless, whenever a 
self-interested provider enters the market, the high gain from collusion might overcome the drawbacks of 
heterogeneity and encourage the altruistic provider to collude. In a sense, it is as if the imbalance 
imposed by providers’ asymmetry that otherwise could prevent collusive behaviour is offset by the 
(asymmetric) regulatory rule  
Our analysis demonstrates that it is important to consider the composition of the market when designing 
yardstick competition arrangements. The incentives to collude depend not only on the type of yardstick 
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scheme but also on the extent to which providers share similar objectives.  With pluralistic markets being 
encouraged in many countries and sectors of the economy it is increasingly important that provider 
heterogeneity is taken into account when designing regulatory policies. 
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A  Appendix 
 
A1 First Best Solution 
 
The solution to the following optimization program 
 
p i,ci
max Wci,pi  1   i 
p i

qxdx  pi − ciqipi  Sci
 
must satisfy the following first order conditions: 
 
∂Wi
∂pi  −qipi − qipi  qipi   
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So that  p∗   and  c∗   denote the optimal level of price and cost that solve the system of equations defined 
by (A1.1) and (A1.2). 
 
A2  Discriminatory rule - Non Cooperative Provider's Solution 
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Given the utility function being maximized, 
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According to the regulatory rule  p̂i  c−i.   Therefore, the first order condition (A2.1) when the two 
providers have the same level of altruism  1  2     so that, in equilibrium by symmetry,  
c−i  ci  c  , is given by, 
 
0)()(0 
 cScqU
c ii  
                                          (A2.2) 
 
Evaluating (A2.2) at  c  c∗   and given (A1.2) we get the same optimal condition as the first best, so that 
the optimal decision of the non cooperative cost ncc  , is equal to the socially optimum for both ownership 
types,   ccnc  . 
Note that the optimal cost does not depend on the level of altruism, indeed  dc/d  0  
 
A3 Collusive Provider's Solution 
 
The two providers maximize their joint profits by optimally choosing  ci  , 
 



   )()()()ˆ()ˆ( max
ˆ
1
2
xdxqcSpqcpJU
i
i p
iiiiic
  
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Thus, 
 



   


)()()()()( max
,
xdxqcScqccJU
i
ii c
iiii
icc
  
When the providers have the same level of altruism, i.e. when  1  2     so that, in equilibrium by 
symmetry, c−i  ci  c , the first order condition with respect to cost is given by, 
 
0)()( 
  cqcS
c
JU                                         (A3.1) 
By evaluating (A3.1) at  c  c∗   and comparing with (A1.2) it follows that, for   ∈ 0,1  , 
 
S ′c∗ − qc∗  0  
i.e. the providers have the incentive to increase the cost above the socially optimum. Moreover as found 
above   ccnc   therefore the collusive cost, cc , is higher than the optimal non cooperative cost,  .ncc   
Proceeding with some comparative static analysis, 
 
dcc/d  − −qc
S "c − q ′c  0  
i.e., the higher is the providers' altruism level the lower is the collusive cost. 
In the special case of the purely altruistic provider, i.e. for    1, by evaluating (A3.1) at  c  c∗   and 
given (A1.2) we obtain the regulator's solution 
 
S ′c∗ − qc∗  0  
We have that the collusive cost is equal to the social optimum; this means that the purely altruistic 
provider has no incentive to collude. 
 
A4 Uniform rule – Non cooperative solution 
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The regulatory rule in two-provider markets is given by )(
2
1ˆ iii ccp  . 
Therefore, the first order condition (A2.1) when the two providers have the same level of altruism  
1  2     so that, in equilibrium by symmetry,  c−i  ci  c , is given by, 
 


ic
U   0
2
)1()('  cqcS                                        (A4.1) 
 
By evaluating (A4.1) at  c  c∗   and comparing with (A1.2) it follows that, for   ∈ 0,1   
 
  0
2
)1()('  cqcS   
 
i.e. the providers have the incentive to increase the cost above the socially optimum. 
Proceeding with some comparative static analysis, 
 
0
)('
2
)1()(''
)(21
,


cqcS
cq
d
dc Unc
  
 
i.e., the higher is the providers' altruism level the lower is the non cooperative cost. 
In the special case of the purely altruistic provider, i.e. for    1, by evaluating (A4.1) at  c  c∗   and 
given (A1.2) we obtain the regulator's solution 
S ′c∗ − qc∗  0  
 
 
A5 Collusive Provider's Solution 
 
The maximization of joint utilities under the uniform scheme is given by, 
 31
 
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dxxqcSccqccJU   
 
Each provider maximizes the joint utilities by optimally choosing ic . 
When the providers have the same level of altruism, i.e. when  1  2     so that, in equilibrium by 
symmetry, c−i  ci  c , the first order condition with respect to cost is given by, 
 
0)()( 
  cqcS
c
JU 
                                                     (A5.1)
 
 
The analysis made for the equation (A3.1) holds for (A5.1) as well. 
 
 
A6 The rate in non-mixed markets 
 
The rate under discriminatory rule is given by, 
 
rnonmixD 
Scc − Sc∗   
cc

qxdx − 
c∗

qxdx
cc − cdqcc   Scd − Scc                     (A6.1) 
 
 
Recall that the numerator of the rates shows the difference between the cooperative and the 
non-cooperative payoffs. 
The rate under the uniform rule is given instead by, 
 
 
rnonmixU 
Scc,U − Scnc,U   
cc

qxdx − 
cnc,U

qxdx
Scd,U − Scc,U  cc,U−cd,U2 q.    
cd,U

qxdx − 
cc,U

qxdx
                   (A6.2) 
 
By comparing (A6.1) and (A6.2), knowing that  c∗  cnc,U  cc,U , it can be shown that the numerator of  
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D
nonmixr   is bigger than that of  
U
nonmixr  . Regarding the denominator, instead, we should consider that the 
defection payoff under the uniform scheme is generally smaller than the defection payoff under 
discriminatory scheme. The reason is that reducing the cost has a negative influence on the price-cap in 
the uniform scheme. Moreover, we have to consider also the increase in the consumer surplus that comes 
along with defective behaviour. This shrinks the difference between the two denominators, allowing us 
to consider the numerator difference as dominating. Thus we may conclude that  Unonmix
D
nonmix rr   , that is 
we can expect more collusive behaviour under a discriminatory than under a uniform yardstick scheme. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
This paper has been produced by the Healthcare Management Group  
at Imperial College Business School 
  
Copyright © Imperial College Business School 2009   
All rights reserved 
ISSN: 1744-6783 
Imperial College Business School 
Tanaka Building 
South Kensington Campus 
London SW7 2AZ 
United Kingdom 
 
T: +44 (0)20 7589 5111 
F: +44 (0)20 7594 9184 
www.imperial.ac.uk/business-school 
